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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 200 years, water coimmissions have regularly examined the
shortcomings of existing water policy. For at least the past 100 years, water
commissions have consistently recommended reforming water policy. The following three themes have repeatedly emerged in these calls for reform: (i) conforming water policy to hydrologic realities; (ii) straightening out counterproductive economic incentives; and (iii) streamlining water-management institutions. Despite regular repetition of these recommendations, powerful vested
interests and passionate political resistance continue to block significant change.
Overcoming this resistance requires new coalitions that can demonstrate how
water policy is relevant to front-page issues and coalitions that can cultivate the
political will and leadership necessary to change the historical course of water
policy reform in our country.'

II. EXAMPLES OF CONTINUING WATER LAw-ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
CONFLICT
The prior appropriation doctrine and its administration have served the
Western United States quite well over the past 125 years, providing flexibility
through the establishment of clearly defined and transferable water rights. How
can it be, then, that a system that evolved specifically to achieve flexibility, efficient use, and avoid monopoly, still exhibits numerous conflicts between the
administration of that doctrine and the most economically efficient patterns of
our use of water resources?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the development of prior appropriation water law occurred in eras when water related technologies were still primitive and the understanding of surface water-groundwater interactions was lacking. Water management has exhibited institutional inertia while the physical
systems have been under increasing pressures from demand and supply imbalances worsened by climate change interacting with population growth. As pressure increases on water management, calls for greater flexibility are also increasing.
A. THE CURRENT CONFLICT IN WELD COUNTY, COLORADO 3

In Colorado's South Platte Basin, many surface diversions allocated for irrigation use date back to the mid-nineteenth century,4and are, thus, quite senior.

1. Janet Neuman, Are We There Yet? Weary Travelers on the LongRoadto WaterPolicy
Reform, 50 NAT. REsOURCrSJ. 139, 166 (Dec. 2010).
2. See, e.g., W. Governors Ass'n & W. States Water Council, Water Trnsfers in the Wes4

i, vi, ix (2012), http://www.westgov.org/inifiatives/water/373-water-tiansfe-s.
3. See also Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Economics:An Assessment ofRiver Calls
and the South Platte WellShut-Down, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 181 (2008) (an earlier article

from which this section is adapted).
4. NEIL S. GRIGG, COLORADO's WATER: SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT, HISTORY AND
POLITICS, 58 (2003); RICHARD STENZEL & THOMAS CECH, WATER COLORADO's REAL GOLD:
A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLORADO WATER, THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION
DOCTRINE AND THE COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, 89-90 (2013) (Hal Simpson,

Issue 2

RECONCILING WATER LA WAND ECONOMIC EFTICIENCY

187

If low stream flows prevent senior rights from diverting the water to which they
are entitled, the water commissioner can put a "call" on the river, requiring all
upstream rights "junior" to the calling senior right holder to stop diverting water
until adequate stream flow is restored.
Following World War II, well drilling exploded in the alluvial valleys of the
West, such as the Republican River Basin, based on improved pump technology, cheap energy, and the absence of regulatory frameworks over wells. ' In
Colorado's South Platte River Basin, inigators tapped into the huge aquifer tributary to the South Platte River with thousands of wells that provided a reliable
and handy water source. During the same period, developments in hydrologic
science clarified the connections between river flows and tributary aquifers, and
it was apparent that well pumping could, indeed, deplete stream flows.'
With this new knowledge of river-aquifer linkage, Colorado's 1969 General
Assembly decided that wells tapping into the tributary aquifer should be incorporated into the priority system - awarding priorities according to the date of
first use, thus making the wells very junior in priority in their respective basins.'"
The State began prohibiting tributary well use during prolonged droughts when
the huge store of groundwater would be most valuable."
To avoid this clearly uneconomic result, the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act (" 1969 Act") allowed the state engineer to approve temporary "substitute water supply plans," or augmentation plans, that would allow
junior wells to continue pumping when there was a call on the river, as long as
the well owners augmented surface flows to make up for shortages attributable
to their current and past pumping - a formidable calculation in itself.'"
During the 1970s, 1980s, and early-1990s, generous stream flows meant
that calls on the river were generally confined to July and August, requiring only
limited well augmentation.'" As the drought of the early 2000s became increasingly severe, surface water shortages led to increasingly frequent calls on the

Dick Wolfe, & justice Gregory Hobbs as contributors).
5. See COLO. DIv. WATER REs., Water Rights Dectionay, http://water.state.co.us/SUR
FACEWATER/SWRIGHTS/Pages/WaterRightsTenninologyaspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2016);
on the change in technology, seeJohn D. Wiener, Roger S. Pulwarty & David Ware, Bite without
Bark: How the Socioeconomic Context of the 1950 U.S. DroughtMininized Responses to a
Multiyear Extreme Climate Event, 11 Weather and Climate Extremes 80, at 87; see STENZEL &
CECH, supra note 4, at 411-12.
6. See, e.g., Colo. Div. of Water Res., Republican River CompactAdmiistraionGround
Water Modcl 1, 6 (2003), http://water.state.co.us/DWRIPub/Documents/rrca model.pdf (noting the increase in groundwater pumping in the Republican River basin after World War II).
7. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Coloiado's Law of "Underground Water": A Look at the
South PlatteBasin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 579, 604 (1988). Colorado underground
water statutes were first enacted in 1963, and reorganized in 1965, as the Colorado Groundwater
Management Act, with substantial changes. Id. at n.3; COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-101-143
(2014).
8. Id.at581.
9. Id. at 582.
10. Id. at 588. The 1969 Act was a partial reorganization of Colorado water law called the
Water Right Detennination and Administration Act. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101-602
(2014).
11. Howe, supra note 3, at 182; MacDonnell, supia note 7, at 582-89.
12. MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 589.
13.

SOUTH PLATrE RIVER TASK FORCE, WELL REGULATION IN THE SOUTH PLAvT

RivER
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river, with almost continuous calls from 2002 through 2006.'" This meant that
the well users who had been operating under "substitute water supply plans"
had to provide much larger volumes of augmentation water if they were to continue pumping while scrambling for increasingly costly surface rights or leases.
Most were unsuccessful. The state engineer shut down more than four hundred
major wells in the early summer of 2006 through 2007, drying up thirty thousand acres of cropland with immediate, severe impacts on the farms and associated rural communities."
With wells shut down, farmers immediately lost seasonal farm incomes because crops had been planted but had not matured.'7 Experts estimated direct
farm income losses of approximately $390 per acre and total income losses of
approximately $690 per acre." These losses will continue into the future until
the State permits wells to operate. In addition to the direct and indirect losses
incurred by the inability to irrigate with groundwater, the groundwater table in
Weld County has risen to the point of flooding basements and making fields
unworkable'9 - an illustration of the legal system imposing a significant ineflfciency on both the farmers unable to use the water and those injured by the
high water table.
B. BARRIERS TO EFFICIENT WATER MARKETS: HIGH TRANSACTION
COSTS AND EXCESSIVE/INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS OF THE ANTISPECULATION DOCTRINE'

One would expect active water markets to correct uneconomic results like
those noted above" because higher-valued junior users would profit from buying lower-valued senior users' water rights.' After all, Colorado has had more
BASIN OF COLORADO, 4 (June 2007), http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/SouthPlatte/files/WellRegu-

lation-SPlatteTaskForce.pdf.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Hal Simpson, State Water Engineer, State Engineer's Office Forum: History of Well
Regulation, South Platte Basin 3 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://dwrweblink.state.co.us/dwrweblink/0/doc
/2810068/Pagel .aspx.
16. Bill Jackson, Salazartries
to help faimers with South Platte wells in the new Farm Bill,
THE GREELEY TRIBUNE (Oct.31, 2007), http://www.greeleynibune.con/article/20071 101/NEW
S/1 11010116#.
17. Jerd Smith, 'Tough News'Doorns Crops - RejectedProposal Would Have Let Fatmers
Start Wells, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws,June 3,2006, at 4A.
18. Jennifer Thorvaldson & James Pritchett, EconomicImpactAnalysis ofReduced hnigated
Acreage inFourRiverBasins in Colorado,COLO.ST.U COLO. WATER INST. 1,34 (2006),http://
www.cwi.colostate.edu/old/pubs/series/completionreport/Compledon%20Repor%20207.pdf.
19. Resolution Re: Declarationof Local Disaster Emergency, BOARD OF WELD COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS (June 11, 2012), https://www.co.weld.co.us/assets/357C9Ad9Ac2b6d744A77
.pdf.
20. Adapted from Charles W. Howe, Reconciling Water Law and Economic Efficiency in
Colorado Water Admnmstration, 16 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 37 (2012).
21. By some measures, the Colorado water market is efficient, but the scope of those
measures is narrower than that proposed here. See Matthew T. Payne et al., PriceDetermination
and EFticiency in the Market for South Platte Basin Ditch Company Shares, 50 J. AMERICAN
WATER REs. Assoc. 1488, 1499 (2004).
22. The term "water markets" can refer to anything from an individual farmer's sale ofa right
to an adjacent town to highly organized markets such as share trading in the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District. See Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goemans, Water Transfers
and Their Impacts: Lessons fiom Three Colorado Water Markets, 39 J. AM. WATER RES.
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than a century of active water markets and has exhibited flexible legal innovations like instream flow protections and other environmental protections.'
However, water markets depend heavily on two key conditions for efficient
functioning: (i) low transaction costs (efficient administrative procedures); and
(ii) a legal framework that creates the potential for a wide range of transactions
(sufficient market scope)." In Colorado, the water court system, through which
all water right transfers must pass, remains cumbersome and costly, thereby ruling out some otherwise desirable market transactions.' At the same time, the
"anti-speculation" doctrine can narrow market scope by preventing the useful
and transparent packaging of agricultural rights to fit urban or industrial demands for large volumes of water. As a result of these two institutional conditions, the correlation between priority dates and economic productivity of the
water supplies remains low."
1. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs of carrying out an appropriation or transfer (in dollars
per acre-foot transferred) include court costs, possible litigation, and evidentiary
showings that the courts require to establish historic consumptive use and noninjury to other water rights holders.' The burden of these costs is squarely on
the applicant." The costs per acre-foot transferred depend on: (i) the size of
the transfer because elements of fixed costs result in economies of scale through
the transfer process; and (ii) on the level of controversy surrounding the transfer, which is partially measured by the number of protests.' In addition to monetary costs, delays in administrative review can inhibit fast turn-around transfers
such as those that agriculture need during drought.'
The need to prove "no injury" to other parties not directly involved in the
transaction is a substantial and often dominant complexity and cost. Proving ex
ante the absence of injury to other parties is much more difficult than an expost
showing of damage. The burden of proof rests on the initiator of the transaction.2 In "over-appropriated" basins, any change in a water right (place and
timing of diversion, quantity, quality impacts, etcetera) is sure to have impacts
Assoc. 1055, 1055-56 (2003).
23. Sasha Charney, Decades Down The Road: An Analysis ofInstreamn low Programs i
Coloado And the Western United States, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD. (July 2005),
htp://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/140CFE4B-65FC-47C5-9A26-99CCB45A8D4,5/0/ISFCo
mpStudyFinalRpt.pdf
24. See Howe, supranote 20, at 38-39; HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS

15-16 (5th ed. 1999).
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Howe, supra note 20, at 39.
Id. at 38-39.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
Id.

29. Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 393, 397, 399, 401 (1990). It is also worth noting that i an applicant in Colorado
appeals the water court's decision to the Colorado Supreme CoMt, the Court will often request
arnicus briefs froin third parties to the suit regarding the proposed water right or transfer, even
further delaying and adding complexity to the review.
30. It seems possible, if not inevitable, that parties needing quick access to water might attempt to privately negotiate with other water users not to oppose their applications in order to
expedite the process.
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
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on other parties. Even though the impacts may be small, current water law
requires "no injury.""2
When the state engineer advertises a change in a water right, any party can
enter an "objection" to the change without proofof damage.' This often motivates towns to enter objections to water right changes in their basins to remain
informed parties to the transactions should concerns for damages emerge from
the transactions." Thus, the balance of power in the water market strongly favors objectors and thereby discourages transactions. Under current practice the
result is often
costly, years-long litigation over small amounts of water - so-called "teacup
changes to stream conditions"... Complicating matters for the applicant, it is
hard to propose mitigation without a clear and accepted approach to evaluate
injury. It is accordingly often easier and cheaper for applicants to simply relinquish or transfer part of their water right to the streamn or objectors than to
prove no injury.
It is also difficult to define mitigation steps where there is no "material" or "de
minimus" standard for injury.'" '
Because Colorado lacks quickly accessible, basic water rights information,
transaction costs further increase. Neither the state engineer's office nor the
water courts have publicly available, centralized databases of water right owners
by name, making it difficult to contact owners. The state records water rights
transactions and ownership at the county level like real estate transactions, 2which naturally complicates cross-boundary transfers. However, Colorado water court decrees are accessible on a case-by-case basis, and the Colorado Decision Support System is rapidly improving access to ownership and
location of diversions.' Nonetheless, there are still substantial complexities in
determining what is transferable.' Equally important, no one comprehensively
recordssale pnces with public access, which complicates the problem of "price
discovery," for example, figuring out what a reasonable offer to buy or sell might
be.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. That many municipalities routinely file for the informational value as well some possibility
of a risk is widely informally claimed, based on the authors' experience of water meetings and
water law. This was confirmed by City of Boulder Assistant Attorney Pault-Afiase, personal communication 17 March 2016; see also COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., http://cwcb.state.co.us/
public-infonnation/publications/Pages/StudiesRepots.aspx (accessed 14 Jan, 2014). Because
there has been substantial competition between municipalities for water supply, there is motivation for close monitoring; see also Banks & Nichols, supranote 35.
35. Britt Banks & Peter Nichols, A Roundtable Discussion on Colorado'sNo-Injury Rule,
44 COLO. LAW. 87, 88 (2015).
36. Id. The costs of objection are quite low. See Colorado Judicial Branch, FilingFees,Strcharges, and Costs in Colorado State Courts,JDF 1 R7/15 (2014), http://www.courts.state.co.us/
Forms/Forms_List.cfm?FormType ID= 176 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
37. Ditches & Diversions, WATER INFO. PROGRAM COLO. DIVISION WATER RESOURCES,
http-//www.wateiinfo.org/colorado-water/ditches-diveisions (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). The
prices are not disclosed or recorded.
38. ColoradoDecisionSupport System, COLO. DEP'T OF NAT. RESOURCES, http://cdss.state.
co.us/Pages/CDSSHome.aspx (last visited.July 18, 2015).
39. See id.
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When a person files an application for change of right, the water court requires the right owner's name and the nature of the changes in the application.'
The water court clerk publishes resumes of such applications monthly, but the
resumes include only limited information: the amount, priority date, location
of the intended beneficial use, and general source of the water." For a water
market to function efficiently, more information, such as the types of crops irrigated and average water applications, is useful.
In 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court appointed a committee to review
the water court process to identify possible ways to achieve efficiencies in water
court cases through rule and/or statutory changes.'2 The committee's recommendations included amendments to the rules of procedure, educational programs for attorneys and judges, the establishment of a standing water court committee, better materials to assist the public and individuals without attorneys,
and necessary funding for the courts and their staffing.' While the recommendations are steps in the right direction, the jury is still out on the effectiveness of
the 2009 changes in the rules' and forms that water applicants must use.' The
paperwork changes may have made the process even more complex and reducing transaction costs remains a challenge in Colorado. The required studies to
show that a proposed water transfer will not impose injury on other water rights
is still the major cause of transactions costs.'
2. The Scope of Water Markets: Market Size; the Beneficial Use
Requirement and the "Spook of Speculation"
Both the geographical extent of the market and the breadth of legally allowable transactions define the scope of a water market: the larger the number of
buyers and sellers, the more likely that market will function in a competitive
manner."7 The greater the scope of the market, the more effective the market
40.

See, e.g., COLO. WATER DIVISION I DIST. COURT, WATER RESUME PUBLICATION

(2012).
41. See, e.g., id.
42. Chief Justice Mary J. Mullarkey, Order Concerning the Establishment of the Water
CourtCommittee of the Colorado Supreme Cour4 COLO. S. CT. OFFICE OF THE CHIEFJUSTICE
(Dec. 4, 2007), http://wvw.courits.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court Probation/SupremeCourt/
Committees/WaterCourLCommittee/Water_CourtCommitteeChie fusticeSigneledOrder.pdf.
43. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Timely, Fai, and Eflkctive Water Courts: Report to the
ChiefJustice,WATER CT. COMM. OF THE COLO. S. CT. (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.courts.state.
co.us/userfiles/File/Court-Probation/Supreme-Court/Committees/Water-CourtCoimmittee/Fina]_Report August I _2008.pdf.
44. James S. Witwer & P. Andrew Jones, Statutoryand Rule Changes to Water Court Practice, 38 COLO. LAw. 53, 53 (2009).
45. See Zach-y Willis, Water Court Forms Agan Updated by Colorado State .Judicial,
COLO. BAR ASS'N. LEGAL CONNECTION (January 12, 2012), http://cbaclelegalconnection.com
/2012/01/water-cour t-fonns-again-updated-by-colorado-state-judicial-new-denver-basiL-application-issued.
46. \W. Governors Ass'n et al., supra note 2, at 15; Banks & Nichols, supa note 35, at 88;
see COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN SECOND DRAVF (luly
2015), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sitcs/default/fils/FINAL-2ndDraftCean-Appendices-2
015%20Revised.pdf.
47. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 37 (1988); the geographic scope of potential transfers can be expanded with increasingly long distances of transfer
and hence energy costs if water is moved uphill, or by means of exchanges of water rights, which
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will be in producing advantageous transactions.' For example, a market that
can generate transactions throughout an entire river basin is more likely to identify advantageous transactions than one confined to a smaller watershed simply
because the larger number of buy-and-sell offers increases the likelihood that
mutually beneficial matches will occur. Conversely, legislative proposals to prohibit out-of-basin transfers would, if passed, also rule out some advantageous
transfers. 9
In Colorado, two closely related doctrines that lie at the heart of prior appropriation further limit the scope of water markets: beneficial use and antispeculation.' Both doctrines originated out of concerns about the monopolization of water suppliesidl The common-sense beneficial use requirements5
were intended to prevent wealthy developers or early settlers from claiming entire streams and to promote efficient use by discouraging "waste" through the
threat of forfeiture of the right.5' However, the doctrines have not kept up with
the times. As ProfessorJanet Neuman states, "the doctrinal trinity of beneficial
use, waste, and forfeiture.., is ill-equipped in its present forn to achieve the
levels of efficiency that will be necessary to meet twenty-first century western
water demands."'

may be const'ained by the availability of other water rights owners to collaborate in a plan; see
Peter D. Nichols, Megan K. Murphy and Douglas S. Kenney, Water and Growth in Colorado:
A Rewvew of Legal and Policy Issues, Natural Resource Law Center, University of Colorado
School of Law (2001); see ELLEN WOHL, VirtualRivers, (Yale U. Press 2001), passim, on historic
development of irrigation and water transfers; see Robert R. Crifasi, A Ind Made from Water:

Appropriationand the Evolution of Colorado'sLandscape,Ditches and Water Institutions, 237244, Boulder: University Press of Colorado (2015); see STENZEL & CECH, supra note 4, at 426427; COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN, https://www.colorado.gov/cowaterplan, at 4-1 - 4-14 and 6-15 - 6-54.(discussing constraints).

48. See id.
49. There are several benefit-cost studies out-of-basin transfers. See, e.g. Howe & Easter,
1971, Interbasin Transfers of Water, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.; Howe, 1987,

Project Benefits & Costs from National andRegional Viewpoints: Case Study of the ColoradoBig Thompson Project,Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1:1-20; See, e.g., H.B. 971286,
61st Gen. Assemb., 1st, Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997); COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD.,
COLORADO'S WATER PLAN supranote 47, at 4-1 - 4-14 and 6-1 - 6-54; see also David C. Taussig,

The Devolution of the No-Injury Standardin Changes of WaterRJghts, 18 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 116 (2015) (discussing transactions costs and limitations on transfers), Banks & Nichols, supra note 35.

50. Scott A. Clark & Alix L. Joseph, Changes of WaterRights and the Anti-Speculation Doctine: 77e ContinuingImportance ofActual Bcneficial Usc, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 553,
562 (2006) (citing High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710

(Colo. 2005)).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (2015); see also High Plains A& M, LLC., 120 P.3d
at nn. 2-3; DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND
DISTRIBuTIVEJusICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 28, 45,48, 62 (2012).
52. Forfeiture of rights is infrequent in Colorado. The state has no forfeiture statute (which,
in other states, returns the water to public use after a specified period of time, regardless of the
water right holders' intentions). An abandonment proceeding requires a showing of intent to
abandon the water right and is required to eliminate an unused right, although abandonment is
presumed if water rights have gone unused for ten years. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(2)
(2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (2012).
53. SCHORR, supra note 51.

54. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste andForfeiture: The Ineficient Search for El iciency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 922 (1998).
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In defining beneficial use, courts have used a custom-based, lowest-common-denominator standard that fails to either motivate the highest-valued water
uses or "ratchet-up" reasonable use standards as better technologies become
available.5 For example, water-intensive flood irrigation should not qualify as a
beneficial use if economic sprinkler techniques are available and widely used,
unless there are other non-crop benefits generated by the flood technique, such
as retiming of flows or ecosystem services.' In general, the water courts may
not be well equipped to say what is - or is not - beneficial, so perhaps water
users, water managers, and water markets should make that determination.
Closely related to beneficial use is the concept of "speculation" and the antispeculation doctrine. In water law, the state has defined speculation, in relation
to a proposed filing or transfer, as the lack of a "specific plan and intent to divert,
store or otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses."57 From the beginning of the change of use process,
these conditions, namely a specific plan and intent, can preclude economically
valuable transactions, such as "packaging" smaller rights to match larger users'
supply needs." When a potential buyer will not commit to buy or lease rights
until the change of use is confirmed, it creates a "chicken and egg" problem
because a definite transferee who has a clear "beneficial use" for the water must
have a specific buyer with a clear "beneficial use.
For example, in High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water
ConservancyDistrict, High Plains acquired extensive water rights and options
on the Fort Lyon Canal in Colorado's Arkansas Basin with the intent of reserving the consumptive fractions of those rights for transfer to unspecified, but
fairly obvious, Front Range communities.' The water court denied High Plains'
change of use application for these supplies and the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the denial in 2005, concluding that the exchange application was speculative.'
Speculators are typically parties who invest in risky situations, banking on
superior information or better-informed anticipation of future conditions to

55.
56.

See id. at 947-48.
See Robert R. Crifasi, Reflcctions in a Stock Pond: Are Anthropogenically Derived
lFeshwaterEcosystems Natural,Ari-ficial,or SomethingElse?, 36 ENVTL. MGMT. 625,632, 635

(2005).
57. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 315 (Colo.
2007) (citing COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a)(II) (2007)). The financial definition of"speculation" is the undertaking of a risky business or financial position in the expectation of a coinmensurate gain. In the futures markets, speculators accept contracts offered by "hedgers" who
seek to avoid risk. This is a vital fmction in the allocation of risk. See VARIAN, supra note 24,
at 236-37.
58. See Howe, supra note 20, at 41.
59. Id.
60. High Plains A& M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 715-16,
721 (Colo. 2005).
61. Id. at 714. The Supreme Court explained that High Plains applied to change water rights
historically used for irrigation for use in any of twenty-eight Colorado counties. The water court
found that "there was no way to determine whether vested water rights would be injured by the
change or to determine if there would actually be a new beneficial use made of the water." The
water court found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the proposed changes were "such a deviation from the original right" that High Plains had effectively requested a new water right altogether, which violated Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine.
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profit from spot and forward sales or purchases. 2 These risk takers are needed
to contract with risk-averse parties "hedgers" for a continuous, efficient market
like those found in the grain, oil, and electric energy markets.' It is reasonable
to assume that the High Plains group had made extensive investigations into
emerging Front Range water needs and the willingness of Arkansas Valley farmers to sell parts of their water supplies. By providing a ready market for farmers,
who wanted to sell some of their water, and an alternative source for buyers,
High Plains could have beneficially served both. However, the anti-speculation
doctrine - regarded as fundamental to the prior appropriation system, as it currently stands - prevented High Plains from doing so."
The Arkansas Valley Super Ditch is an innovative proposal in which participating farmers agree to fallow part of their irrigated land on an annually rotating basis, so they can lease part of their collective consumptive use to other
users for longer terms.' The proposed project allows water supplies to pass
temporarily from agricultural users to other users without permanent sale of the
underlying water rights.' Many protesters who filed against the Super Ditch in
Division 2 Water Court alleged that the exchange application (1OCW4) was
speculative. 7 In spite of those protests, in 2015 this innovative institutional arrangement succeeded in effecting several small transfers 8with many more likely
to follow.
Some have argued that the biggest impediment to successful water banks
and leasing programs, like the Super Ditch, is the lack of easily understandable
information available to water rights holders about how such systems would
function. " While California, Idaho, and Arizona have relatively active water
banks, Colorado lags behind."0 In 2004, the Arkansas River Basin attempted to
establish an internet-operated water bank, but the lack of understanding among
potential participants of how the internet-operated water bank would function
and the poor design for price discovery, it failed."
62. See geneiallyVARIAN, supranote 24, at 236 (discussing how and when to measure and
equalize risk).
63. COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 47, at 55-70.
64. High Plains,120 P.3d at 714.
65.

Peter D.

Nichols, DEVELOPMENT OF LAND FALLOWING-WATER LEASING IN THE

LOWER ARKANSAS VALLEY (2011); see also Super Ditch,THE WATER INFORMATION PROGRAM,
http://www.waterinfo.org/super-ditch (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
66. Nichols, supra note 65.
67. See Chris Woodka, IrrigationRegulations DiawProtestsAcross Valley, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Dec. 28, 2009,12:00 AM), http://www.chieftain.conVnews/loca/irrigation-regulations-draw
-protests-across valley/articlc_816422e6-8fa9-50d9-87c9-98a02b4d2eIe.hnil.
68. Nichols, supra note 65; see also Chris Woodka, Catlin Lease Gets State's Blessing,
PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Jan. 28, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.chieftain.com/special/water/3285662120/arkansas-ditch-super-valley.
69. Peggy Clifford, Clay Landry & Andrea Larsen-Hayden, Analysis of Water Banks in the
Western States 1, ii (2004), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/0411011.pdf.
70. See id. at 29-31, 38, 55, 61.
71. This is the conclusion of John Wiener, who observed (and participated in) all known
public discussions on the design and development of the Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Project. John Wiener, Next Steps for the Arkansas River Basin Water Bank Pilot Program 1, 6, 9
(2005), http://www.coloado.edu/ibs/es/wiener/papers/WBSummExpMarO5G.pdf; see also COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., Brief History of Ark Basin Water Bank, http://cwcbstate.
co.us/loansgrants/altemative-agricultural-water-transfer-methods-grants/documents/briehistoryarkbasinwaterbankfeb21.pdf (last visited February 18, 2016); Ralph Terry ScangaJr., Update
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There is no question that the anti-speculation doctrine has discouraged participation in water banking or pilot leasing programs. Effective administration
should, instead, have the effect of injecting more information and flexibility into
water markets.72
3. The Uneven Application of the Anti-Speculation Doctrine
The State has, in effect, unevenly applied the prohibition of speculation,
and users have frequently circumvented it." The Denver Post investigative series, "Liquid Assets: Turning Water into Gold," cited cases that showed that
water brokers acquired water rights for undefined future sale, through temporary application, to specially formed water districts." The subsequent High
Plainsruling has not prevented local governments from forming additional special districts to accumulate water rights for later sale to unspecified users.

For

example, the United Water and Sanitation District consists of a one-acre patch
of land that can serve users anywhere in the state while accumulating water rights
for unspecified future sale.6 Another example is the thirty-nine-acre Elbert and

Highway 86 Commercial Metro District, which is a statewide district that intends to build a 150-mile pipeline from the Lamar Canal to Elbert County for
unspecified users." Thus, while the State attempts to take an anti-speculation
stance, highly speculative transactions have been able to proceed.
Another forn of circumvention that denies the water market access to vital
information is the frequent, secretive purchase of options to buy that are not

disclosed, and remain undisclosed along with the prices paid or future prices."8
This effectively end-runs the anti-speculation doctrine while making relevant
market information even less available.
Colorado has not considered that conditionalwater nhts (typically granted
to municipalities for future planning) are speculative even though some have
not been perfected for one hundred years." It is difficult to distinguish between

of Water Bankingin the Arkansas Presentedto the Interim Water ResourcesReview Comnmttee
(August 21, 2013), https://www.colo-ado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/13WaterResourcesUpdate
onWaterBanking.pdf. The Interim Water Resources Review Committee is a committee of the
Colorado General Assembly, the legislature, which continues work between sessions.
72. SeegenerallyClifford,Landry& Larsen-Hayden, supranote 69, at 19, 24 (discussing why
the transfer process should encourage flexibility and to whom information is provided).
73. See, e.g. David Oliiger & Chuck Plunkett, Liqmd Assets: Turning Water Into Cold,
DENV.POST, (Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.denverpost.comi/news/ci_3235495.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id.; Karen E. Crummy, Colorado water developer 'looted"development, lawst alleges,
DENv. POST (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21563447/coloraado-water-developer-looted-development-lawsuit-alleges.
77. Karen E. Crummy, Elbert County C(omnission Water DistrictSoon CouldReachAcross
Colorado, DENV. POST, (July 27, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/ci-18556062.
78. See Olinger & Plunkett, supra note 73.
79. J. GregorylJ. Hobbs, Jr., Colo. S. Ct., Anti-Speculation and the Great and Growing Cities
Doctrine, 41st Annual Conference on Environmental Law for ie American Bar Association
(Mar. 23, 2012); Charles.J.P. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Conditional Water Rights in the Western
United States: IntroducingUncertaintyto PBiorAppropriation,51J. AM. WATER RES.ASS'N. 14,
17 (2015); Casey S. Funk & Daniel J. Arnold, Pagosa. The Great and Growng CitiesDoctrine
Imperiled An Objective Look from a Biased Perspective, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 284,
294-96 (2010); see also Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P. 3d

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 19

urban planning needs and "speculation." Many oil shale related conditional
water rights are more than fifty years old, while some conditional irrigation rights
are over one hundred years old.8" By their mere existence, conditional rights
whose development is uncertain introduces another element of uncertainty for
all water users, especially those junior to the conditional rights.'
In a real sense, considering water prices are broadly expected to continue
increasing, every water right owner is a speculator.2 Most investment groups
that have recently invested extensively in western United States ranchland
clearly are not in business to raise cattle, but to acquire water rights."

"SpeculatorsAll""',
C. THE "No INJURY" REQUIREMENT FOR APPROPRIATIONS & CHANGES
OF USE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXTERNALITY THEORY

Colorado water law does not allow negative impacts to other water rights
owners when changes of use or new appropriations are made." No injury is

307, 309-10 (Colo. 2007); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 219 P.3d
774, 777 (Colo. 2009).
80. Derek L. Turner, PagosaArea Watcr & SanitationDistict v. Trout Unlimited and an
Ant-Speculation DocrineIor a New Era of Water Supply Planning; 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 639,

643 n. 20, 670 n. 181 (2011).
81. Podolak & Doyle, supranote 79.
82. See Charles W. Howe & John S. Howe, The Performance of Water Ser ice Industry
Stock Prices and Sensitiiity to Highly Publicized ContractFailures,31 WATER INT'L 448, 448

(2006).
83. Id. at 448; Josh Zaffos, What happened to heritage tourism in small towns in south eastern CO, COLO SPRINGS INDEP. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.csindy.com/coloradosprings/what-

happened-to-heritage-tourism-in-small-towns-in-south-eastern-co/Contentoid
84. Bruce Stark, Baltinore Times, n.d.

85.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(2)(a) (2014).
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perhaps the most basic tenet of appropriations doctrile.86 We can consider
such impacts as "negative externalities" imposed on other parties. It is well
known from economic theory and common practice that it usually does not pay
to totally ehninate a negative externality.87 The efficient level of externality reduction (as defined in economics) is where the marginal cost of further reduction by the initiating party rises to equality with the (falling) marginal damage to
the external party.' The figure below shows this point where Q* is the optimal
negative externality level. In most cases, this degree of reduction is less than
eliminating the externality altogether. Thus, with few exceptions, the legal requirement not to impose any cost or injury on other parties will preclude some
desirable changes and distort the scale, even though it carries a degree of fairness.
Allowing the initiating party to compensate the injured party for absorbing
some damages can overcome this inefficiency. Rational bargaining should lead
to a solution close to the efficient level. Water lawyers can use this procedure
to overcome objections to filings and changes.'
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Colorado requires the water rights transferor who seeks a change to bear
the burden of proof that other water rights will not suffer injury.9' Many potentially injured parties may be involved in a proposed transfer and they have an
incentive to hold the transferor to the high burden of proof. Such parties can
86.

David C. Taussig, The Devolution ofthe No-Injry StandardinChanges of WaterRights,

18 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 116, 118-19 (2014).
87.

VARIAN, supra note 24 at 578.

88. Id. at 578.

89. Banks &Nichols, supra note 35.
90. THOMAS TIETENBERG AND LYNNE LEwis, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
ECONOMIcs, 8 ED., 358-62, (2009).

91. Banks &Nichols, supranote 35, at 87.
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enter objections to the transfer at a cost as low as just the filing fee. 9 Further,
towns in Colorado typically enter pro forma objections to all proposed changes
in their basin just to guarantee participation in the proceeding.93 This practice
increases costs to the transferring party even if no injury is likely. In many cases,
the costs of bearing the burden of proving no injury can exceed the potential
benefits sought through the transfer, further preventing efficient transfers that
lower costs would allow. 4 This may also particularly impact small operations
such as specialty or organic producers where agricultural water rights loans involve relatively small volumes, which have a 120-day duration, and a limitation
on use to three years out of a ten-year period."
The absolute no injury rule also hampers the goal of maximum beneficial
use.' California and Oregon lead Western efforts in striking a balance between
no injury and motivating conservation. The Oregon law provides a transferable water right9 of 75% of conserved water that proves no injury to other water
rights. The state or political subdivision retains 25% of the conserved water
(subject to determination on a case-by-case basis).' This creates a margin of
safety from injury to others and applies on a case-by-case basis rather than as a
general principle.'"
D. FAILURE TO MOTIVATE WATER SALVAGE: THE COMPLEX CASE OF
PHREATOPHY[ES

Agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the West, so modest increases in efficiency could make substantial amounts of water available."' In
addition to direct irrigation applications, vegetation along streams and ditches
consumes large volumes of water in agricultural areas.' °2 These phreatophytes
("well plants") may be native, as in the case of cottonwoods (Populusspp.), or
invasive as in the case of tamarisk (Tamaltx spp., commonly known as Saltcedar), and Russian Olive (Eleagnus angvstifoia).'" Phreatophytes consume
92. See FilingFees, supra note 36.
93. Authors' conclusion; supra note 34.
94. Banks &Nichols, supra note 35.
95.

COLO REV. STAT. § 37-83-105 (2012).

96. SCHORR, supra note 51, at 107.
97. J.K. Fischer, Muddy Waters: The Right to Conserved Water in Idaho,27 IDAHo L. REV.
303, 303-05 (1991); COMMrITEE ON W. WATER MGMT. ET AL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 82-83 (National Academies Press 1992);

W. Governors Association et al., supia note 2, at 32, 97-98, 110-11.
98. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.480 (1993).
99. Michael Hohnart, Cartots for Conservation: Oregon's Water Conservation Statute OfAtrs Incentives to Invest in Efficiency, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 827-54 (1995).

100.

Id.

101. Warren E. Bergholz, Jr., Water Saved or Water Lost. The Consequences of Individual
ConservationMeasuresin the AppropriationStates, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 435, 435, 44557 (1976); Michael Gheleta, Water Use Efficiency and Appropriation in Colorado:Salvaging
Incentives for Maximun Beneficial Use, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 657, 657-58, 660 (1988).
102. P.L. Nagler, E.P. Glenn, C.S. Jarnevich & P.B. Shafroth, DistributionandAbundance of
Saltcedarand Russian Olive in the Western UnitedStates, 30 CRITICAL REVIEWS INPLANT SCIS.

508, 509 (2011).
103. Patrick B. Shafroth, Curtis A. Brown, & David M. Men-itt eds., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & THE USDA FOREST SERVICE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS REPORT

2009-5247,
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more than a half million acre-feet of water in the South Platte alone." ' In some
sites, these plant communities may provide the only bank stabilization and habitat, while in others their removal may provide opportunity for large reductions
in non-beneficial consumptive use. ' The challenge is to motivate their removal
in the non-beneficial situations.
Colorado refuses, on principle, to allow "salvage" rights (Le., the right to
use the water saved through phreatophyte eradication for other purposes, or to
allow any form of conservation credit for phreatophyte removal).' 6 New Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds famously said, "filf individuals salvaging public water lost to encroaching phreatophytes were permitted to create new water
rights where there is no new water, the price of saltcedar jungles would rise
sharply. And we would expect to see a thriving, if clandestine, business in saltcedar seed and phreatophyte cultivation .....
Saltcedar and Russian Olive species are "the third and fourth most frequently occurring woody riparian plants, and the second and fifth most abun-

dant species (out of 42 native and non-native species) along rivers in the western
United States.'.. Critical bank and channel stabilization, sediment retention,
water temperature control tlrough shade, and ecosystem processes such as denitrification sometimes depend on these species in large areas." Where farming is or is becoming uneconomic, and flow regulation and changed flow recession timing are present, these species dominate. "' The halophytic satcedar species may also dominate where salinity has increased due to irrigation, changes
in evaporation, or changes in flow regimes."' Changing fire dynamics also play
an increasing role."' Consequently, given the high volumes of water at stake and

ACT SCIENCE AsSEssMEIrr,
104.

vii, 4, 21, 23, 123 (2010).

REAGAN M. WASKOM, REP. TO COLO. LEGIS., CONCERNING

HB12-1278

STUDY OFTHE

SOUTH PLATTE RIVER ALLUVIAL AQUIFER 69I GEN. ASSEMB. (2013).
105. Replacement of dense salt cedar and Russian Olive communities is expensive and laborintensive; see BUREAU OF RECLAMATION ET. AL; supra note 103.
106. See Colo.Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P. 2d 1321, 1324, 132627 (Colo. 1974);J. Gregory Hobbs, Colorado Water Law: An Histoical Overvew,1 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 1, 23 (1997).
107. See Shelton Farms,529 P.2d at 1327.
108. Nagler etal., supra note 102.
109. Id.;
see WALTER K. DODDS AND MAT R. WHILES,FRESHWATER ECOLOGY: CONCEPTS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMNOLOGY, 2d Ed. 2010) 83-105, 345-57, 369-73,

643-62; Mariet M. Hefting, Ronald N. van den Heuvel and Jos T.A. Verhoeven, Wetlands in
Agnicultural Landscapes for Nitrogen Attenuation and Biodiversity Enhancement Opportunities
andLinitations,56 ECOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 5 (2013).
110. Nagler etal., supra note 102.
111. J.C. Stromberg et al., Legacies of lood Reduction on a DrylandRiver, 28 RIVER RES.
APPLiC. 143, 143-44, 155-56 (2012); Laura G. Peny et al., VulnerabihlyofRiparianEcosystems
to Elevated C02 andClimate Change inAridandSemiaridWestern North America, 18 GLOBAL
CHANGE BIOLOGY 821, 829-31 (2011); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & THE USDA FOREST
SERVICE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2009-5247,
SALTCEDAR AND RUSSIAN OLIVE CONTROL DEMONSTRATION ACT SCIENCE ASSESSMENT, vii,
4,

21, 23, 123 (Patrick B. Shafroth, Curtis A. Brown, & David M. Merritt eds. 2010).
112. TheresaJedd, Colo. State. Univ., COLORADO CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY STUDY
32, 37 (Eric Gordon and Dennis Ojima eds. 2015); Jeff Lukas et al., Univ. Colo., CLIMATE
CHANGE IN COLORADO: A SYNTHESIS TO SUPPORT WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND

ADAPTION 34, 34-35, 81, 84 (2014).
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the ecological values that phreatophytes sometimes generate, the "salvage" definition and policy is increasingly important and complex.'13 Someone who "salvaged" water from existing uses could receive a transferable right. to it if "the
water salvaged was, prior to the institution of the conservation measures, not
otherwise available for appropriation."' The costs of making such a showing,
however, may have prevented many such efforts to conserve water."' Strict traditional interpretations of beneficial use and waste, coupled with policies not
requiring modernization or investment in efficiency,"' are "virtually institutionalizing historic patterns of waste."'
The rigid Colorado policy limits incentives for change. The Federal government made very substantial investments in phreatophyte control, though the
Natural Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
does not provide a central summary of the state-by-state allocations."' How
much water could be restored to other uses with an incentive allowing transferability is unknown, but might be quite large. It is critical to the protection of
other water rights that the transferable anounts not extend beyond the property
owner's own water rights, and the market must motivate transfers so that water
now being non-beneficially transpired can be freed for transfer to higher-valued
uses.
17

Im. THE ESSENTIALS OF WESTERN APPROPRIATIONS DOCTRINE AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
A. THE PRIOR APPROPIATIONS DOCTRINE
The Eastern United States generally uses a riparian system in which landowners adjacent to watercourses originally held all the water rights."9 Eastern
riparian states have transformed the system over time into various forms of "regulated riparian law."'" The essential feature of riparian water law - reasonable
accommodation for riparian water uses - was deliberately jettisoned in the

113. In Colorado, "saved" water made available from reduction of return flows has been distinguished from "conserved agricultural water" made available from reduction of a water right
owner's historic consumptive use, and "salvaged" water is that made available from a non-beneficial use. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO WATER PLAN FINAL DRAFr, 192-93
(2015), http://coloradowaterplan.com. The distinction between saved and salvaged in the case of
riparian area phreatophytes would be harder to draw were it not for the explicit treatment of the
issue in the Shelton Fansdecision. Shelton Faims,529 P.2d at 1325.
114. Bergholz, supra note 101, at 443.
115. Gheleta, supra note 101, 663-64.
116. Neuman, supra note 54 at 922, 956-57, 961.
117. Mark Honhart, Carrotsfor Conservation: Oregon's Water Conservation Statute Offers
Incentives to Invest in Eficiency, 28 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 832 (1995).
118. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATURAL REs. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.
gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/progamns/financial/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (detailing areas
of federal intervention and investment concerning riparian preservation); see alsoTHE TAMARISK
COALIrrION, MISSION & VISION, http://www.tamariskcoalifion.org/about-us/our-mission (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (representing a concerted effort by an independent coalition to curb loss of
water in riparian lands and prevent further expansion of invasive plant species.).
119. SCHORR, supra note 51, at 51-52.
120. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Ripanian Rights to the Twenty-lirst Century, 106 W.
VA. L. REV. 536, 583-84 (2004).
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West.'2'
Water law in the Western states developed from water scarcity and the need
for cooperation.' The West adapted a model designed from the system of
water claims used in the goldfields of the Sierra Nevada Mountains in California." Prior appropriation law is named for the system recognizing that the earliest claim on a stream flow has a right prior to subsequent claims.' The prior
appropriation doctrine is most clearly developed, and straightforwardly applied
in Colorado.' 5 As David Schorr argues, avoiding monopoly or financial control
over water, and thus control over other activities, was a central goal in the prior
appropriation system evolution.'" Further, to solidify the basis for investment
in water-dependent activities, water rights are granted as a property right rather
than a permit that might be subject to government modification,'" thereby increasing uncertainty for the owner.
Western American water uses, much like European uses, began with mining and farning, followed by early municipal-industrial development that employed gravity delivery.'" The need to use water away from river-bank land
ownership led to adopting water rules based on mining practices occurring during the California Gold Rush subsequently codified as the Mining Law of
1872.'" In the Western United States, water quality regulation is largely separated from water quantity administration, reflecting that the right to use a volume of water is indeed a property right, while rights to a particular quality of
water are derived from Federal and State laws, and their administration. '
The concept of beneficial use is important in Western water law because it
limits how often a water is applied and because it is also defines a limit..on the
water right - excessive application constitutes waste. " Major changes in the
concept of beneficial use include expansions of the uses for which water rights
are granted, led by the innovation of in-stream flow ights for environmental
protection.' Groundwater regulation is another example of legal evolution.'
The physical complexity of groundwater has proven challenging all over the

121.

SCHORR, supra note 51, at 5.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id.at 5
125. Id.
126. Id. at 7 (explaining that history shows that prior appropriation was concerned with "equitable distribution of water and limiting the power of corporation... a like commitnent to equal
access and the prevention of concentrated control over water").
127. J.Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. Reviving the PublicOwnership, An6-speculation andBeneficial
Use Moorings of the Pn'orAppropnation WaterLaw,84 COLO. L. REV.97, 117 (2013).
128. Scc STINZEL & CECH, supra note 4, at XIX.
129. DAVID W. GETCHES, WATER LAWIN ANUTSHEI., 74-75 (5th ed. 2012); ScHoRR, supra
note 51, at 25;JOHN R. LESI-Y,THE MINING LAw: A STUDY IN PERPErUAL MOTION, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future (1987).
130. See Hobbs, supra note 127.
131. GETCHES, supra note 129, at 110.
132. Neuman, supra note 54, at 920.
133. GETCHrS, supra note 129, at 120.
134. Charney, supra note 23.
135. See intia section 3.
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West, likely requiring further regulatory changes.'"
B. THE CONCEPT AND IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN
NATURAL RESOURCE USE
People undertake economic activities, both public and private, with the in tent of generating certain positive results, or "benefits."' 7 Certain negative llfnpacts, referred to as "costs," are necessary to produce benefits.'" These benefits
and costs are likely to come in quite different units, but the relevant decision
maker must conduct some kind of comparison in deciding whether to undertake any given activity.'" Presumably, the decision maker's point of view guides
whether the activity's benefits exceed the costs, (i.e., if "net benefits" are positive).
Colloquially, economic efficiency means avoiding waste and getting the
greatest social good out of our limited resources, or "getting the biggest-bangfor-our-buck" from our resource use. "' In technical terms, using scarce resources over a period of time that maximizes the present value of net benefits
to society is how we achieve efficiency.' It can be applied to issues at the national level (e.g. ,in deciding among levels of federal expenditure on health,
transportation, environment, etcetera); at the regional level, (e.g., Bureau of
Reclamation multi-state projects); or at the individual project and policy change
level (e.g. deciding on the size of a flood control dam or clean water policy
rules). The cost-benefit analysis was first developed at the project level.'
Consider a proposal to build a dam on a river with the intent to produce
electric power, irrigation water, improved land values, water for cities and towns,
water-based recreation, and flood control. In physical tenns, these outputs constitute the benefits of the project. To construct and operate the dam, the public
will incur various costs some of which are obvious, and some not so obvious.
These costs may include, but are certainly not limited to: construction costs;
operation and maintenance costs; population inconvenience during construction; loss of the outputs of farmland and livelihoods taken by the reservoir; instream recreation losses; deterioration of water and air quality; and damage to
riparian ecosystems.

136.

See Edella Schiager, Challenges of Governing GroundwaterinUS.Western States, 14

HYDROGEOLOGYJ. 350, 351, 354, 360 (2006).
137.

JOHN O'NEILL, ECOLOGY, POLICY AND POLITICS: HUMAN WELL-BEING AND THE

NATURAL WORLD 44 (Taylor & Francis e-Library 2004).
138.

Id.

139. HARRY F. CAMPBELL & RIcHARD P.C. BROWN, COST-BENEFr ANALYSIS: FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL USING SPREADSHEETS 3.2 (2d ed. Roudedge, 2016).
140. JAMES BRADHELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 8

(2007).
141. R.A. Young, Economic Criteriafor Water Allocation and Valuation, inCosT-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 13 (Ray Brouwer & David Pearce eds., 2005).
142. C.D. Griffiths & W. Wheeler, Benelit-cost analysis ofregulationsalectingsurface water
qualityin the United States, in Cos-r-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

223, 227 (Ray Brouwer & David Pearce eds., 2005) ("Comparing all of the monetized gains in
consumer utility, called benefits, to the monetized losses in utility, called costs, is BCA"); A.
ALLAN SCHMIDT, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: APOLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 10 (1989) ("To
judge whether proposed public spending or regulation improves aggregate welfare we need a way
to add up the costs and benefits to all individuals").
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Achieving economic efficiency in designing and operating the dam requires
addressing three questions: (i) Is the project designed (size, technology, outputs
included, location) to generate the largest net benefits?; (ii) Are the resultant net
benefits (benefits minus costs) positive?; and (iii) Is this project a good use of
resources compared to other uses?
When evaluating a project, we must start with a description of physical benefits and costs. Thus, the project evaluator must address the following issues:
(Q1) How can the physical benefits and physical costs be compared?; (Q2)
Whose benefits and costs are to be included?; and (Q3) How should future
benefits and costs be compared with today's benefits and costs? The affected
parties and how the benefits mad costs impinge on their interests will determine
the answers to each of these questions,"5but the standard practice is to use a
national accounting of benefits and costs to all affected parties." '
(Q1). Comparing Physical Outputs & Costs. The project proponent could
sinaply describe the physical outputs and costs for the decision maker's comparison. For example, a description of the outputs could include: Kilowatts of
energy produced annually; acre-feet of irrigation water produced annually; acrefeet of flood storage with resultant reduction in flood danages; natural and scenic areas created; and recreational sites created. Concerning the costs, a description could include: construction costs; anticipated lifetime operating and
maintenance costs; opportunity cost of the water evaporated; agricultural lands
and production lost; loss of stream fishing;, and damage to riparian ecosystems.
The problem is that public officials will have trouble balancing these physical
benefits and costs in the public interest. In the absence of a widely accepted
quantitative procedure for project evaluation, socially bad projects and special
interests may dominate the evaluation and ultimately waste scarce resources.
The obvious, and standard, solution for comparing outputs and costs is to
attach prices to the project inputs and outputs to see if the sum of the monetized
benefits exceeds the sum of monetized costs.' 5 Most prices are set in markets,
but some are administratively set, while indirect tests estimate others."" Available prices may or may not incorporate all the social values that should be taken
into account. The following situations can occur mi our search for appropriate
prices:
Some benefits and costs are valued using prices that result from reasonably
competitive markets or from competent administrative determination, thereby
closely reflecting social gains and losses;
Market prices may be readily available, but may contain distortions because
of unfair trade practices, monopoly market power, price controls, or failure to
account for "externalities;" nonetheless, corrections can be made in most cases.
No market price may exist, but various credible techniques can estimate the
143. See SCHMIDT, supra note 142, at 15 (explaining that: "Interdependence exists in any situation of scarcity, because one person's choice and use of a resource affects the options open to
others.").
144. See CHARLES W. HowE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR WATER SYSTEM PLANNING 16
(1971).
145. Griiffiths & Wheeler, supra note 142.
146. ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER CONCEPTS AND
MErHODS, 161-221(2005), (synthesizing a variety of valuation methods and their application, with
particular treatment of irrigation water).
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unit value indirectly, such as using: travel cost methods for outdoor recreation;
contingent valuation for values of protecting ecosystems; and other benefit-cost
measures taken from completed benefit-cost analyses in similar situations.
Some benefits or costs simply cannot be given prices that are credible within
a given society's value system, (e.g. the loss of important species and ecosystems
or destruction of unique historical artifacts). While someone evaluating these
items may not include it in the discussion, they should describe such considerations in footnotes to the analysis. Some may include the value of a human life
in this category, but there are credible techniques to estimate values of human
life.
(Q2) Whose benefits and costs to include. The most responsible answer is
that benefits and costs apply to all parties regardless of location (local, state,
regional, national, global) or social class. The usual practice is to take into account benefits and costs within national boundaries, using a "national accounting stance" for benefits and costs." However, regional and local administrators
may find a regional or even local benefits and costs accounting more useful for
certain types of projects.
(Q3) Comparisons of benefits and costs over time. How should decision
makers compare streams of benefits and costs that are incurred over long periods of time? For example, most people would prefer to receive $100 today
rather than wait (t) amount of years simply because they can start enjoying the
use of the money today, either to satisfy consumption needs or to earn interest
over the coming (t) years." Simple financial algebra shows that if the sum B(0)
today can be invested at an interest rate (r%) per year, the value in (t) years will
be:
B(t) = B(0)(1+r) or B(0) = B(0/(1+r)Y'
B(0) is referred to as the "present value" of the future sun B(0. °
These observations suggest that a project could be evaluated by the difference between the "present value" of benefits and costs:
PVNB = [B(0)-C(0)J + E IB(t)-C(0/(l+r)'
where B(0) and C(0) are the up-front benefits and costs and B(t) and C(t)
are the annual benefits and costs.'"' Economic efficiency requires that the project is designed and evaluated using these criteria and that PVNB>0 holds.
IV. STEPS TO MITIGATE THESE INEFFICIENCIES
A. EXPANDING ROLES FOR WATER MARKETS THROUGH THE REDUCTION
OF TRANSACTION COSTS

As noted in Section 1.B, transaction costs are those costs imposed on the

147. HOWE, supa note 144.
148. See DANIELW. BROMLEY, THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, 45-60,
111-138, (Cambridge, MA, Blackwell 1995).
149. Howe, supra note 144 at 65-79.

150. Id.
151.

Id.
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market participants, primarily on the transaction initiator in a water market.' 2Furthermore, the bulk of these costs arise in complying with the high burden of proof for the no-injury rule.'" Other costs arise from gathering necessary
data related to the transaction mad compliance with water law, which usually
involves legal assistance as well as engineering supervision. Under current administrative procedures, the water market strongly favors objectors and discourages transactions that are not large enough to warrant the expense and delay of
elaborate engineering and legal contests in water court. This means that wellfinanced actors, like municipalities with stronger financial bases, participate in
water markets more than smaller agricultural entities, for whom small expedient
transfers would be especially beneficial late in the season, but who face disproportionately higher costs."
Data needs include searching to find partners for the desired transaction.
With market areas spanning entire river basins, gathering this information isn't
simple. While the Office of the State Engineer advertises proposed changes to
existing water rights and past transactions,'5 it does not keep or publish records
of water right. Thus, some transaction participants experience difficulty with
"price discovery," (i1e., in judging what a reasonable price might be).
Policy makers, attorneys, and interested parties have recommended several
changes to these practices. A simple step would be to allow the presumpbve
use of historical data to determine diversion, consumptive use and other paranmeters of the case. The Colorado Legislature allowed
6 for this in its attempt to
establish a water bank in the Arkansas River Basin..
A second step would be to define through legislation some range of allowable negative impacts on existing users within which protests could not be pursued. This would reduce the number of "teacup" injury protests even though
it would involve some residual loss for impacted parties. 5 Britt Banks and Peter
Nichols point out that the Colorado State Legislature has already statutorily declared that some types of water use do not enjoy no injury protection, namely
small capacity household wells, gravel pit storage, and groundwater depletions.'"
However, it is not clear that exempting these uses is warranted because smallwell use in a basin can be quite large while substantial volumes of storage in
gravel pits and a lowering water table can also certainly have negative impacts
on other users.15 Ironically, State law allows increasing the consumptive use of
a water right through increased crop consumption despite reducing return

152.

COLO. REV.STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).

153.

Id.

154. Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs & Peter Butler, 7Trasacdons Costs as Determinants
of Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 401, 404 (1990).
155. See, e.g., COLO. WATER Div., supra note 40.
156. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-101 (2014); see also OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER,
COLO. Div. OF WATER REs., RULES GOVERNING ARKANSAS RIVER WATER BANK PILOT

PROGRAM (2002), http://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/DisplayRule.do?acion=i-uleinfo&ruleld=212
1&deptlD-13&agencylD.-133&deptNamne=400%20Department%20of%20Natual%20Resourc
es&agencyNmne=402%20Division%20of%20Water%20Resources&seriesNum- 2%20CCR%20
402-12 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); see also Scanga, supra note 71.
157. See Banks & Nichols, supranote 35, at 88.
158. Seeid. at87-89.
159. See Waskom, supra note 104.
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flows."
Various other states have suggested measures of allowable impacts within a
de miniis standard. Idaho's Court has allowed a 10% injury band of other
parties' water rights, although water users strongly contested this."' Impact frequency and duration should be included in such determinations because cumulative de ninjs
changes could have significant impacts on existing rights and
riparian ecological conditions with water quality impacts.
A final issue is where the burden of proof lies. Typically, the burden of
proof lies on applicant for a change of use. 6 Some people suggest, after initially
establishing non-injury, the burden of proof in further appeal actions should
shift to the objector." Britt Banks and Peter Nichols conclude that the current
system is too costly and rigid, and argue that shifting some legal burden onto
objectors in change proceedings would restore the balance that shifted over
time. 4
B. MODERNIZING THE ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE
1. Traditional Justification for the Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Inconsistent
Application
David Schorr states that,
Itihe unofficial codes of the Colorado mining disticts.., focused primarily on
rules designed to ensure wide distribution of property. Similarly, the statutes
of the Colorado Territory, the water-ight provisions of the State constitution
of 1876 and the early judicial decisions culninating in the leading case of Coffin v.Left HandDitch Co., were mainly concerned to prevent control of water
by capitalists, and did so by breaking the common-law monopoly of riparian
owners...

The "originating principles" of Colorado prior appropriation doctrine includes public ownership, anti-speculation, and beneficial use limitations that circumscribe the amount and manner of use of each water right.'"
As noted in Section I.C, the no injury principle precluding damage to other
water users constrains both changes in water rights and initial appropriations.
To effect this restriction, Colorado's water courts need to identify potentially
damaged parties related to a transaction. Water courts gather this information
in two ways: through the transaction publication and protest process, and by
requiring applicants to identify all parties and water uses related to a proposed
160. This is the result of unwillingness to dictate crops or technology; see Neuman, supranote
1, who explores this throughout her article.
161. Jeffrey C. Fereday & Michael C. Creamer, The Maximum Use Doctrine and its Relevance to Water Rights Administration in Idaho's Lower Boise River Basin, 47 IDAHO L. REV.
67, 74 (2010); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 37.03.11.042 (2015); see Clear Spring Foods, Inc. v.
Spackman, 252 P. 3d 71 (Id. 2011).
162. COLO. Rev. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
163. Banks & Nichols, supra note 35, at 88, 90.
164. See id. at 90.
165. David B. Schorr, Approprination as Agranamsm: DisibutiveJusticein the Creation of
Property Jbghts, ECOLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005).
166. See Hobbs, supra note 127, at 101-02.
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transaction at the time of application.'6
In spite of these requirements, the anti-speculation doctrine is not consistently applied, as illustrated by several water acquisition practices that are blatantly speculative. Granting conditional water rights to cities also allows holding
rights against an uncertain future need. Charles Podolak and Martin Doyle note
that it is "completely permissible in accordance with the anti-speculation doctrine to hold on to a water right for many decades... As a result, there are a
large number of bld conditional water rights in Colorado.' 68 Some of these
conditional rights have remained unperfected for over one hundred years."'
Podolak and Doyle also show that the State has allowed a large volume of conditional water rights to remain valid "until market conditions improve," for the
oil, gas, and oil shale industries."'
2. The "Chicken-and-the-Egg" Problem Restated: Modernizing AntiSpeculation.
Water law defines speculation as a "lack of a specific plan and intent to
divert, store or otherwise capture, possess and control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses.""' As mentioned above, this can preclude economically valuable transactions because someone seeking to transfer his or her
water right must first find a buyer with a clear beneficial use, yet buyers are
hesitant to commit without knowing if there is a valid change of use."'
The modernization of anti-speculation as presently applied seems warranted by the adverse impacts on available public information, as noted here.
With any reasonable form of a no-injury rule, a proposed change decree or.
administrative approval of an augmentation plan or substitute water supply plan
would trigger an examination, and that would require adequate specificity to
show at least a presumption of no injury."' We suspect that the status quo,
following the elaboration of the anti-speculation doctrine in the Pagosa cases
favors those with more information over those with less."' Organizations such
as municipal water providers and those playing the role of brokers with high
levels of information, typically face irrigators (sellers) who may not have as
much infornation, or financial capacity to acquire it, as the potential buyers."'
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168.

CotO. WATER Div., supra note 40; COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2014).
Podolak & Doyle, supra note 79, at 31.
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Seeid. at 14.
Id. at 25, 27, 29.

171. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 315 (Colo.
2007) (citing COLO. REV.STAT. § 3792-103(3)(a)(II) (2007)).
172. See Howe, supranote 20, at 41.
173. For discussion of possibilities, see Banks and Nichols, supra note 35.
174. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 315 (Colo.
2007) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-103(3)(a)(II) (2007)), and PagosaArea Water& Sanita-

don Disaictv. Trout.
Unlimited (PagosaII) 219 P.3d 774 (Colo. 2009); see also Turner, supra note 80 (discussing the
anti-speculation doctrine as related to urban supply acquisition.)
175. This is implicit in the discussion of "alternative water transfer mechanisms" in COLO.
WATER CONSERVATION BD., supranote 46, at 6-111 - 6-122 (Chap. 6 Sec. 4); we argue that this

asymmetry in information is an important hindrance to the expansion of markets and have experienced confirmation in a series of workshops held by the Ditch and Reservoir Company Alliance
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The high transactions costs of transferring water and the concerns with information asymmetry are believed to inhibit commitments, and thus also disclosure of interest."'
Re-thinking the High Plains case, one company was seeking what would
have been in effect a license to market water rights it had acquired or water from
exercise of options it had acquired.' The inability to identify the risks of injury
indeed made the application for a change decree outside of the intent of the
current no-injury rule, as it could not be applied as presently held. '" But the
interactions with other elements of current Colorado water law are critically important. As Taussig demonstrated, the invocation of expensive and uncertain
determinations of historic consumptive uses of an irrigation water right as a "devolution" of the no-injury rule may be seen as defense of water rights, but it may
more powerfully limit willingness to participate."9 With the risk of reduction of
a water right, and relatively low information on the potential value, entering the
market in public becomes a "chicken-and-egg" problem: without better iniformation on potential final value, and with a risk from seeking the information,
the status quo is maintained and the anti-speculation doctrine defeats its own
purpose. It purports to limit speculation only by creating opportunity for purchasers of options to buy from those working with very likely poor information
about other potential sellers and about prices being paid. The results, as shown
by Olinger and Plunkett'8 °are secrecy, non-disclosure terns, and disadvantage
to those with little bargaining power. The irony includes the fact that the antispeculation doctrine was originally intended to limit the power of wealth to control irrigation water.'8'
In a similar situation, the Colorado Corn Growers Association, Aurora Water, and Ducks Unlimited tried to develop a system where farmers could amend
their water rights for other uses.' Farmers could auction their water rights in
years they were not planning to use them while cities, industry, or conservation
groups could bid for the flows. 1" Colorado water attorney, AndyJones, asserted
that the flex market is a "narrow, intentional exception to the State's anti-speculation rule," which the involved parties were hm effect "trying to create incenNonetheless, various water agencies
tives for water to stay in agriculture."''

(www.DARCA.org) in which John Wiener was participant and served as rapporteur for the Alliance; these meetings were held 02 and 09 December of 2015 and 27 January at the Colorado
Water Congress, and tour in June and July of 2014.
176. See Howe, supra note 20, at 41.
177. See LawrenceJ. MacDonnell, Public Water-Pivate Water:'Anti-Speculaton, WaterReallocation, and IJgh Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District
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helped to defeat the bill that would have authorized the market.'
In spite of these rulings, a developer recently announced plans to buy
14,600 farmland acres with connected water rights to the Fort Lyon Canal.'86
Whether this will pass the speculation test remains for the court's analysis. Perhaps unfortunately for the rural economy of this area, the court will not decide
whether the change is speculative until there is an application for a change of
diversion, place, or kind of use. Although the Fort Lyon Canal Company may
scrutinize the farmland and water shares purchase as a real estate transaction,
there is no State or public involvement without some other triggering event.
Even filing a change in ownership in water court may not invoke any scrutiny.
The Colorado Water Plan's "Colorado Water Values" urge increased collaboration by encouraging all interested parties to participate in the review process
earlier.'87
From the public or social perspective of economic efficiency, the externalities involved in long ditches call for particularly close scrutiny to determine the
full range of costs involved in a transfer, potential mitigation, and local impacts,
which may or may not elicit local or state goverment involvement.' For examnple, water courts shall impose conditions on a transfer to mitigate the impacts
on local tax bases and sometimes require revegetation and noxious weed prevention."
The key to economic efficiency may be a modernized anti-speculation policy, which encourages early disclosure of aspirations, including willingness to
bargain. Then, implementation would follow the rules and regulations optimizing use of water consistent with preservation of the priority system of water rights
(as was sought for groundwater management).'"
3. Accommodating Uncertainty in Water Administration
Section I.C argued that the no injury rule is too severe and that certain "de
minimis" standards can avoid unneeded litigation over "teacup cases." Section
III.B. 1 pointed out that conditional water rights are issued on grounds of projected water demands that are subject to broad uncertainty, although the Pagosa
rulings require tighter standards.'8 ' The Pagosarulings recognized the need for
planning.'" The legal system recognized and adapted to the tension between

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. WATER PLAN, supranote 113, at3-3
188. For a full description of considerations and contemporary ecosystem valuation sources
for additional information see ARKANSAS BASIN ROUNDTABLE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE TO URBAN WATER TRANSFERS: REPORT OF THE WATER TRANSFERS GUIDELINES
COMMITTEE (September 10, 2008) http://cwcb.state.co.us/public-information/publications/Pag
es/StudiesReports.aspx. For current methods and applications of ecosystem valuations, including

benefits for amenity, recreation and some real estate value information, see Earth Economics,
NATURE'S VALUE FROM CITIES TO FORESTS: A FRAMEWORK TO MEASURE ECOSYSTEM SERVIcES
ALONG THE URBAN-RURAL GRADIENT (2014) www.eartheconomics.org.
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planning needs and speculation, and to the need to accept some range of uncertainty in various dimensions of water administration to have a workable system. This is manifested in modifying the "great and growing cities doctrine .....
In a similar fashion, the courts should relax the currently severe anti-speculation
doctrine when judging proposed water market transactions that are forwardlooking. The planning expertise of diverse water actors would then play a role
in efficiently distributing water supplies over time through the market and
amongst uses.
In major world markets, speculators play a vital role in allocating unavoidable risk by allowing "risk averse" parties to contract against the risks they face. '
This is true in the grains, oil, and electric energy markets.'9 Even the priority
doctrine allocates risk by differentiating between senior and junior rights that
permit water users to adjust their portfolios to the degree of risk desired.
4. Encouraging Institutional Innovation in Water Administration
The Colorado Legislature established water banks in each major basin."
hile it is clear that well-designed water banks can be quite effective in distributing water over time and among uses, it is also clear that we must follow the
lessons of past attempts, successful and failed.'97
The term "water banking" means a variety of ways of trading the use of
water.'9" The Colorado Legislature's earlier experiment with a failed pilot program in the Arkansas River Basin resulted in a non-profit brokerage mechanism
trading only stored surface water. The most significant advance may have been
the precedent-setting agreement to use presumed figures for conveyance loss
and consumptive use fractions from each major ditch, based on recent modeling and decades of data." However, the negotiations over injury and litigation

193. Id. at 639, 651.
194. See VARIAN, supia note 24, at 236-37.
195. JOSEPH P. STIGLITz, ECONOMICS, W. W. Norton & Company, 153-165 (1993).
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197. See Payne et al., supranote 21, at 1488.

198. See Clifford, Landry & Larsen-Hayden, supra note 69, at ii.
199. OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, DISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF COLORADO, RULES GOVERNING THE ARKANSAS RtvrR

WATER BANK PILOT PROGRAM (2002), codified at 2 Code of Colorado Regulations 2 CCR 40212, incorporating 2007 changes, http://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/DisplayRule.doaction-nuleinfo
&rulld-212l&deptID = 13&agencyID=133&deptNane=400%20Depau-rnent%20of%20Natural
%20Resources&agencyName=402%20Division%20of%20Wate-%20Resurces&seies
Num=2%20CCR%20402-12.
We argue that the 2002 ruies were quite signiticant because of their acceptance of presumptive
figures for transferable consumptive use from each of the major ditches in the lower Arkansas
Valley. The claim that these were based on years of data and previous adjudications is based on
the observation and participation in all known public meetings in the rule-making.
The confidence in past engineering was related to the development of a hydrologic model with
water rights included, called the "Hydraulic-Institutional Model", which was "blessed" by acceptance for use in the U.S. Supreme Court original jurisdiction case, Kansas v. Colorado, No.
105, Orig., 514 U.S. 673 at 678-687. Hundreds of pages of detail are included in the reports of
the Special Master appointed for the case, http://www.supremecourLgov/SpecMastRpt/Spec
MastRpt.aspx; see Report Original Case 105 No. 091997 at 7-20; subsequent reports md agreemient continue to use this model.
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concerns took substantial time and effort, while neither the internet-based ilplementation system facilitated price discovery, nor did most of the potential
users trust it...
This experiment in modifying traditional prior appropriation law reduced
transactions costs and delays in water transfers, and was intended to increase
flexibility to agricultural water rights holders' benefit. Most people expected
this flexibility to become increasingly desirable during conditions of scarcity and
to foster new approaches to alternative water transfer mechanisms ("ATMs").
However, because actors in the water market widely expected to encounter immediate litigation, the Office of the State Engineer and many parties negotiated
a set of compromises, which reduced this theory with substantial appeal to an
implementation that did not allow for any practical uses. The delay in execution
was long enough to render implementation inapplicable for emergency or sudden needs, and the duration of the allowable lease-like transfer was not long
enough to meet more predictable municipal and industrial needs. ' By the time
the water bank website went operational, the season had largely passed, and the
limited outreach program had not had the opportunity to explain the website
and procedures. 2 Thus, water users made only a few offers and a few bids
resulting in no transactions (a view of the offers is available from Colorado Water Conservation Board)."
Arnong the lessons learned from the Arkansas Water Bank Pilot Project is
the critical need for clear understanding among participants. The Colorado
Water Plan and many years of public discourse somewhat meet this level of
understanding, but it likely is not fully accomplished for any of the ATMs. 4
Potential users must be able to clearly identify: what is transferable and under
what conditions (e.g., what if the water is not provided to the transferor?); the
duration of the transfer contract or performance, if initiated; the timing of calls
to perform or initiate; different prices for different timing, if desired (e.g., to
cover incurred farming costs, which would be wasted if irrigation is stopped, or
the costs of establishing a cover crop, including any needed water); how the
irrigator will cope with farming interruption problems (e.g., will there be an arrangement for payment at times suitable to employ skilled labor in alternative
tasks); how the ditch company or district will manage with the reduced flows;
and how the share-holder and ditch company will assess the water rights and
delivery, or foregone delivery.
C. SECURITY AND INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE

There are hundreds of ways in which land ownership is divided among parties with different interests, such as direct users, easement holders, covenants
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for mutual benefit within an area, local land use regulations and zoning, state
and federal regulations, mortgage lenders, and investors and creditors of many
kinds. ATMs, as pilot projects, provide a great leap forward in water sharing.
Municipalities have the capacity, for example, as partners in joint ownership
of some water rights, to employ bonding capacity for very low-cost capital.
Farmers have the senior water rights and the land, but are in need of capital and
a longer planning horizon to transition from crops with very high water needs
to more diverse farming systems. Water providers can and should represent
the public's interests in conjunction with local government, regional coalitions,
and consumer groups, such as school districts that use local and regional farm
products, with frequent opportunities for public comment.
We must think of agricultural potential, urban and industrial supply,
and
environmental benefits, and consider what a desirable future would include.
Many consider this the goal of Integrated Water Resource Management. Municipalities simply thinking "just get the water" is no longer adequate for the
pressures and the problems we already face, and will face more intensely in the
coming years.
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